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STATEMENT OF' FACTS
A chronological statement of the facts out of which
this litigation grew, aside from the findings in each of the
cases, we think will do much toward eliminating the utter
confusion that exists because of continuous litigation extending over a period of years.
On November 23, 1926, John W. Smith entered into a
contract to purchase from M. M. Johnson, receiver of the
Nielson-Burton Company, co-partnership, 473.67 acres of
land together with 180 shares of the water stock of the
Pocatello Pipe Line Company for the .sum of $10,118.78.
Nothing was paid on account of the purchase price of the
property at the time of the execution of the agreement.
The first payment of $2,000.00 was to be made on or before
the 25th day of November, 1927, and $2,000.00 each year
thereafter. The contract is in evidence as Exhibit 3. It
contained the usual provisions for the payment of taxes
and the insurance of crops produced by the purchaser,
and it contained a specific provision for the cultivation
of the land, planting to fall wheat and for the application
by the purchaser to the Federal Farm Loan Association
for a loan upon the property to be paid to the seller and
further that :
In the event the buyer shall default in the payment of
special or general taxes, assessments or insurance premiums, as provided for, that the seller might pay the taxes
and collect from the buyer with interest at the rate of one
percent per month; that the buyer should make reports
to the seller setting forth in detail the amount of land
planted,
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And further
''As security for the payment of any installment
of the purchase price, any sums due and delinquent
from previous years, and/or any sums which may
become due from the purchaser of this contract within any particular year, the buyer hereby mortgages
to the seller all crops of every kind and nature which
shall be grown by him or his successors upon the said
land during the year in which such payment or sums
shall have become due." (Exhibit 3-Abs. 75.)
And further

''In the event the purchaser shall fail to make
any of said payments, or to perform any of the
covenants herein by him agreed to be performed
within thirty (30) days after written notice of default and demand for performance of the covenant
or covenants as to which it may be claimed he is in
default shall have been served upon him by the seller personally, or in the manner provided by law for
serving notices, or by letter addressed to him at
Ridgedale, Idaho, the seller, at his option, may declare a forfeiture of all of the rights of the purchaser
under this agreement, and the seller shall thereupon
be released from all obligation in law and equity to
convey the said property; and upon such forfeiture
being declared all rights of the buyer hereunder, and
all and any interest that he may have in the said
premises shall immediately cease and terminate, and
the said buyer shall become at once a tenant at will of
the seller, anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, and the seller may keep and retain all payments theretofore made by the buyer on account of
the purchase price as compensation for the use of
the said property and as liquidated damages for the
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failure of the buyer to fully perform the contract of
purchase on his part, and the seller may at his option
re-enter and take possession of the said property,
without legal process, as in his first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions
made by the buyer thereon, including any and all
crops growing upon said land at the time of the said
election to terminate and forfeit the said contract,
and the said additions and improvements and growing crops shall remain with the land and become the
property of the seller. It is specifically agreed that
time is of the essence of this agreement." (Abs. 76.)
Smith was constantly in default on the contract. He
failed to pay taxes, and the taxes from the beginning accumulated and in order to prevent loss of the property
w:ere paid by the seller. On November 25, 1930, an installment of $2,000.00 came due with accumulated interest at seven percent per annum on the entire amount. The
buyer had no means of making this payment by reason
of which the contract was not only subject to forfeiture,
but forfeiture was inevitable. (Abs. 78-79.)
Smith had been sued by Wilse A. Nielson, the son of
A. J. Nielson, one of the partners in the business for
which Johnson was made receiver. He had defaulted to
the extent of $1208.91 besides interest in December of
1929. (Exhibit E.) The taxes had not been paid for 1926,
1927 and 1928 and were delinquent for 1924 on part of the
ground. The taxes amounted to $410.79. (Exhibit E.)
This amount was bearing interest at one percent per
month. In addition to his troubles growing out of delinquencies, which he could not by any possibility cure,
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three different ju~oments had been entered against him
between September 12, 1929, and May 22, 1930. He had
exhausted his credit at the banks and with relatives and
it therefore became certain that if Johnson, the receiver,
should so elect, the contract was at an end. (Abs. 82-8389.)
Furthermore Smith's equipment was not such that he
could cultivate the land economically and hope to be able
to make enough money from the land to take up delinquencies and pay the contract out. His son, Cameron
Smith, had credit sufficient to enable him to borrow
$1,000.00 from the bank and this he used to pay on the
contract. He also had a new tractor which had cost him
$1500.00 and he was willing to transfer it so as to save the
contract. ( Abs. 82, 90.)
At that time, Smith had residing with him a dependent
daughter and was entitled to a homestead exemption of
$2300.00. ( Abs. 101.)
He and his sons and his daughters thereupon organized the Smith Land Company and by assignment transferred to the corporation the contract for the purchase
of the land, the corporation assuming the balance due
upon the contract. Cameron Smith was given credit for
the $1,000.00 paid to keep the contract alive. In addition
to the contract there was transferred to the corporation
the caterpillar tractor of a value of $1500.00 and horses
and farm equipment then on the place. (Abs. 67.) The
caterpillar tractor was used to plow and cultivate the land
and to harvest the crops. Cameron Smith, for the most
part, operated the tractor and combine harvester and
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plows. Stock of the corporation was is.sued to various
members of the family and stock of the par value of
$2800.00 out of an authorized capital of $10,000.00 was
issued to John Smith as trustee which he testified was
intended to be used to pay creditors including the plaintiff and his assignor in this case. The uncontradicted
testimony is that John W. Smith was indebted to his
daughter and to his mother and brothers for money borrowed in attempting so save the contract. (Abs. 82.) His
testimony is that he offered to issue stock of the corporation to plaintiff and his assignor and that they refused to accept it. (Abs. 79.) Payments upon the contract were made by the corporation between November
28, 1930, and November 29, 1932. (Exhibit 9.)
And on November 29, 1932, Charles D. Moore, who
was then proposing to acquire title to the land and contract asked Smith, the Smith Land Company and Careron Smith to agree that if he acquired the contract that a
new contract would be made by the terms of which the
balance due would be fixed at $4,000.00 payable in installments, $1,000.00 cash and $1,000.00 annually thereafter
with eight percent interest. The agreement included the
Smith Land Company, John vV. Smith and J. Cameron
Smith. A new form of contract was not executed but the
proposal adopted the terms of the original contract and
clearly recognized the interest of the Smith Land Company in and to it. (Abs. 59.) Numerous letters were addressed to the Smith Land Company by Charles D. Moore
as owner of the land and the contract. He, at all times,
recognized the Smith Land Company as a corporation
6
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and as the owner of the contract. (See letters and receipt. Exhibit 9.)
On the 16th day of August, 1930, Bertha Skeen, a
judgment creditor represented by her husband, D. A.
Skeen caused execution to be issued out of the office of the
clerk of the district court for Box Elder County and the
sheriff, by praecipe was directed, to levy upon the defendants' property :
''To the Sheriff of Box Elder County:
You will please proceed to levy upon any property
either real or personal which you may locate belonging to the defendants in Box Elder County, State of
Utah, and advertise the same for sale pursuant to
the execution and levy as soon as you may do so.''
D. A. Skeen
Attorney for Plaintiff" (Abs. 114.)
On December 3, 1930, a return was attached to the
execution and deposited in the office of the sheriff. The
execution was handled by Joseph R. Olsen, a deputy who
thereafter died. There was attached to the execution as
an exhibit the following letter.
To John Zundell:
''Dear Sir:
John W. Smith has requested me to advise you that
he has no money or property out of which the execution you hold against him might be satisfied.
The property he occupies was purchased on contract and title reserved to both the land and the
crops, any equity he might have had was sold some
time ago.
Respectfully,
J.D. Skeen" (Abs. 113.)

'1
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The execution with the return and the exhibit with an
additional notation by John H. Zundel, Sheriff to the
effect that the matter was handled by Joseph R. Olsen,
who was deceased, was filed June 26, 1937. (Abs. 114115.)
The complaint in this case alleges the issuance of the
execution and its return unsatisfied. (Abs. 2.)
On December 7, 1936, Wilse A. Nielson, the plaintiff
herein, having become the owner and holder of the legal
title to the land covered by the contract and of the contract, served notice of forfeiture of the contract for failure to pay the balance due upon the purchase price of the
property amounting to the sum of $2433.88. The notice
specifies seven particulars wherein the purchaser was in
default and by virtue of which the forfeiture was to be
made. ( Abs. 61.)
Immediately thereafter, the Smith Land Company
procured part of the necessary money to make the payment from the sale of wheat and borrowed $1900.00 from
the wife of John W. Smith, made tender of the total balance due, and demanded a deed which the plaintiff Nielson refused. Suit was brought in Salt Lake County by
the Smith Land Company for specific performance. (Abs.
87.) Wilse A. Nielson had brought suit July 9, 1935, and
the two suits were consolidated by stipulation and were
brought on for trial.
On October 10, 1935, John vV. Smith was adjudged a
voluntary bankrupt. He scheduled as debts : To Bertha
Skeen, a judgment creditor $100.00; to Wilse A. Nielson,
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judgment creditor, $54.90, and to Wilse A. Nielson, Judgment creditor, $1278.00. As assets he scheduled a library
of 1200 books of a value of $500.00, five hundred shares
of the capital stock of Smith Land Company pledged to
Andrew W. Smith and a life insurance policy.
The record of the bankruptcy court show.s a petition
for confirmation of a sale of the land described in the
complaint herein, an order confirming a sale to A. F.
Turley for the sum of $500.00 and a deed from the trustee
in bankruptcy to A. F. Turley purporting to convey all
of the Smith assets to Turley. (Abs. 44.)
The deed purporting to convey the title, dated April
14, 1937, from AlbertS. Wheelwright, trustee to Aubrey
F. Turley specifies all the right, title and interest in and
to the following described property. Then follows description of the property covered by the contract from
M. M. Johnson, receiver, to John W. Smith. (Exhibit B.)
On February 4, 1939, the district court made and
entered an order reading:
"It is now ordered that Aubrey F. Turley be and
he hereby is substituted herein for Albert S. Wheelwright, Trustee in Bankruptcy of John W. Smith, a
bankrupt and as such substitute is hereby made a
party to this action with all rights and liabilities
accruing to him as such substituted party.'' Dated
this 4th, 1939. Filed April4, 1939. (Abs. 116.)
A petition for review of the order of sale in the bankruptcy court was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah and the court is now holding the
matter under advisement.

9
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Separate findings were made in the two cases. In the
Box Elder County case, the court found the execution and
delivery of the contract and that at the time of the trial
of the case, there was $2433.88 due on the purchase price
of the land. (Abs. 116-131.) There is no finding as to the
amount due at the time of the assignment of the contract,
on October 30, 1930. The court further found that John
W. Smith on or about the 30th day of October, 1930,
caused the Smith Land Company to be incorporated and
transferred to it all of his property including the contract and that it was the alter ego of the said John W.
Smith, that the transfer of stock to members of his family
was wholly without consideration, except as to the stock
transferred to J. Cameron Smith in the amount of
$1,000.00 and that Cameron Smith turned over to the association a tractor; that the organization of the Smith
Land Company was a contrivance to evade and avoid the
payment of his creditors; that it was made with intent
to defraud his creditors; that Smith had continued to
operate through and in the name of the Smith Land Company; that John W. Smith, on the 30th day of October,
1930, was not married, but was the head of a family having one married daughter and two minor children living
with him and dependent upon him for support and maintenance; that he was entitled to a homestead exemption
of $2300.00:
"That at the time of the transfer of the said
property and the contracts covering the purchase of
the same and all rights thereunder by John W. Smith
to Smith Land Company, the said property was of a
10
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value of $30.00 per acre and the equity and interest
of the said John ,V. Smith in said land at said time
was of a value far in excess of $2300.00. And at the
time of the trial of this action, the said property so
held under the contract to purchase thereof and the
equity of the said purchaser and his successors in
interest under said contract was of a value far in
excess of $2300.00 over and above the balance of the
purchase price and all liens against said property.''
(Abs.123.)
That the organization of the Smith Land Company and
the transfer of the property was made more than three
years prior to the filing of the action :
" . . . but the said transfer was not recorded
with the County Recorder of Box Elder County, or
at all, and the facts and circumstances connected with
the said transfer were not called to the attention of
the plaintiff and his assignor of said judgment or
either of them, and the plaintiff and his said assignor of said judgment did not know of the said
transfer and did not have knowledge of facts sufficient to charge them or either of them with knowledge of such transfer until within three years prior
to the filing of this action or until within one year
before the 11th day of July, 1935." (Abs. 123.)
The court finds the entries of the judgments as hereinabove stated, the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy
proceeding, the contents of the schedules, that John Smith
acting through the Smith Land Company on July 1, 1938,
deposited with the clerk of the district court of Salt Lake
County $2433.88. That at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy the property and interest of John W.
Smith therein constituted an asset and that it passed to
11
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the trustee in bankruptcy and then the court finds that
in the bankruptcy proceeding all the interest of Albert S.
Wheelwright as trustee was sold to Aubrey F. Turley
subject only to the homestead exemption of John W.
Smith and the court further finds:
"That in the courts of the bankruptcy proceeding,
costs expenses of administration accrued in said
bankruptcy proceeding. That no funds have been
provided by the said bankrupt to pay the said costs
and expenses. That the only asset of the said bankrupt out of which the trustee may pay the said cost
and expenses and the said judgments of Wilse A.
Nielson as set out in the findings herein, is the property described in these findings." (Abs. 128.)
From the findings the court concludes that the transfer of John W. Smith to the Smith Land Company of his
interest in the property was fraudulent.
''That the intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, is
entitled to a judgment adjudging, determining and
fixing a lien upon the said property in these conclusions described, and the whole thereof, for the total
amount of the said judgments as entered, wHh costs
and interest accruing thereon to April 1, 1939, and
for the full amount of the expenses of administration of the said bankruptcy proceeding in said bankruptcy court as fixed and determined therein, the
said judgments alone as set out in the findings herein, with interest and costs accruing to April1, 1939,
being in the amount of $2529.36." (Abs. 130.)
The court entered the decree adjudging and decreeing
the transfer void over and above a homestead exemption
to the extent of $2300.00.
12
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"That upon the payment by the Smith Land Company to W. A. Nielson of the smn of $2433.88, as the
balance of the purchase price due on said property,
the intervenor, Albert S. 'Vheelwright is entitled to
a judgment and decree and an order of sale of said
property to satisfy the said liens in full, together
with the costs and expenses of such sale." (Abs.
131.)

In the Salt Lake County case, the court made substantially the same findings many of which were not in
issue, drew substantially the same conclusions and entered
a decree to the effect that the assignment of John W.
Smith was void; that the defendant, Wilse A. Nielson,
execute and deliver to John W. Smith and the Smith
Land Company, a corporation, a deed of conveyance and
transfer to them a certificate of stock for 180 shares and
upon the execution and delivery of such a deed and stock
that the clerk of the court pay to the said Wilse A. Nielson $2433.88 theretofore deposited by the Smith Land
Company with the clerk of the court as a tender of the
balance due on the contract. John W. Smith was not a
party to~the Salt Lake City suit. (Abs. 135-152.)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
The assignment of errors are long and numerous
comprising 40 in all and covering 1llh pages of the abstract. We will not reprint them but will summarize the
specific points upon which we rely for the reversal of
this case. The points are all covered by the assignments
as follows:
13
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1. The homestead exemption was pleaded and found
without controversy. It did not constitute the subject
matter of a conveyance in fraud of creditors because it
was not and is not subject to a judgment lien, execution
or forced sale. The contract was subject to forfeiture at
the time of the assignment, long prior thereto and substantially all of the time subsequent thereto and until
the tender of the balance due was made just before the
institution of the Salt Lake case, and there is no finding
that said contract was of a value in excess of $2300.00.
(Box Elder Case Assignments Numbers 1, 6, 15, 16, 18.
Salt Lake Case Assignments Numbers 1, 6, 12, 13, 14, 16,
17.)
2. The corporation was recognized by plaintiff, Wilse
A. Nielson and his predecessors in interest as a valid
legally organized corporation as early as November,
1930, and at all times thereafter until tender by it of the
$2433.88 balance due on the contract, and plaintiff in the
Box Elder County case and defendants in the Salt Lake
County case are now estopped from denying the existence of the corporation and the ownership of the contract. (Box Elder Case Assignments Numbers 3, 12, 13.
Salt Lake Case 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19.)
3. The Statute of Limitations ran two years before
the institution of the Box Elder County suit and the cause
of action, if one ever existed, was barred at the time the
suit was brought. (Box Elder case Assignments Numbers
7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17. Salt Lake case Assignments Numbers 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19.)
4. The court was without jurisdiction to enter any
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judgment in favor of the intervenor, Albert S. \Vheelwright for the reason as alleged that the United States
Bankruptcy Court had eonfirmed a sale of the interest
of the said trustee in and to said property, a deed of
c~nveyance of the interest had been made and the purchaser, and Aubrey F. Turley was substituted as a party
to the suit for the said trustee. (Box Elder Case Assignments Nos. 8, 9, 14, 16. Salt Lake Case Nos. 14, 18, 20.)
5. The court had no jurisdiction to enter any judgment based upon an order of the Bankruptcy Court, and
the provision including in the judgment the costs and expenses alleged to have been taxed in the Bankruptcy
Court were wholly without jurisdiction and void. (Box
Elder case Assignments Nos. 8, 9, 14, 16. Salt Lake Case
Nos.19, 20.)
6. The judgment is not sustained by the evidence or
by the :findings. (Box Elder case, Assignments Nos. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 16, 17. Salt Lake Case Assignments Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16 17.)

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
Under Article 22, Section 1 of the Constitution and
Title 38 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, the homestead
exemption is absolute. The numerous decisions of this
court leave nothing open for argument. Smith was the
head of a family under Section 38-0-5 and the property
constituted a homestead exemption to the value of
$2300.00. It was not subject to a judgment lien under
104-30-15 because the statute makes it a lien only upon
15
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property "not exempt from execution," and it was not
subject to execution sale because of Title 38 and Title
104, Chapter 37, and it was not the subject matter of an
attack for sale or other disposition in fraud of creditors.
The right to a homestead is an absolute right which
neither the legislature nor the courts can infringe. Panagopulos vs. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. (2d) 614.
Neither the legislature nor the courts have the right
to subject it to a forced sale. Utah Builders Supply Co.
vs. Gardner, 86 Utah 257.
The homestead may be sold and a good title passed.
Revised Statutes Title 38-0-2.
''A homestead cannot be made the subject of attack by a creditor upon the ground that it was sold
or conveyed in fraud of such creditor." (Payson,
etc., vs. Tietjen, 63 Utah 321.)
The plaintiff in attacking a transfer must allege and
prove that the value of the property exceeded the exemption allowed by statute. Crosby vs. Anderson, 49 Utah
167, 162 P. 75.
To hold as the lower court has done that a homestead
conveyed continued to be .subject to attack nullifies section 38-0-2 which reads :
'' . . . when a homestead is conveyed by the
owner thereof such conveyance shall not subject the
premises to any lien or encumbrance to which it
would not be subject in the hands of the owner; and
the proceeds of the sale thereof to the amount of the
exemption existing at the time of sale shall be exempt from execution or other process for one year
16
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after the receipt thereof by the person entitled to
exemption.''
The value at the time of the sale of the homestead is
to be determined by the court, as stated by Justice Straup
in Giesy Walker Company vs. Briggs, 49 Utah 205, 220,
162 P. 876.

"It is the amount of the exemption of the proceeds of a sale of a homestead which is fixed as of
the time of the sale of the homestead not of the levy.
But property subject to levy, whether proceeds of
sale or other property, is as of the time of the levy;
that is the creditor by levy may take only such property as at the time of the levy is not exempt and is
subject to levy.''

In utter disregard of this statute, the court heard evidence as to the value of the land at the time of the trial
and made a finding that the value then exceeded the homestead exemption of $2300.00. No evidence was offered as
to the value of the contract which was about to be forfeited and which then by the findings of the court constituted the homestead exemption of John W. Smith. No
finding was made as to the value at that time, but on the
contrary, the court treated the conveyance which was
authorized by the statute quoted as utterly void and attempted to subject the land itself to a judgment seven
years later.
By such a sale homestead property would be taken
out of the class of property subject to mortgage and sale
and the owners would be deprived of one of its principal
values; that is the right of sale and disposition. The stat-
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ute was enacted pursuant to the terms of the constitution,
Article 22, Section 1 and cannot be disregarded.
The contract at the time of the assignment from John
W. Smith to the Smith Land Company was subject to
delinquencies in payments, delinquencies in taxes and
failures to make report. The contract then was not subject to judgment lien or execution sale because there was
a large balance due upon the contract and evidently when
Nielson, through his attorney, directed the sale of the
property by the sheriff, the directions were not followed
up because there was no equity to be sold. The plaintiff
alleges in the Box Elder County case that executions were
issued and returned wholly unsatisfied. (Abs. 2.)
By reference to the abstract, page 112, it will he seen
that execution was issued upon the request of Benjamin
Spence, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff, and the
sheriff was specifically directed to levy upon the property of John W. Smith. The execution was issued on the
16th day of August, 1930, about two months before the
contract was assigned. The return was prepared by the
deputy, since deceased, on December 3, 1930, to the effect
that he had made due search and inquiry and no property had been found. Plaintiff was not in a position to
controvert the return because he alleges the fact in the
complaint, repeats it by adoption in the complaint in intervention and in the amended complaint filed June 22,
1937, and adopts it in the amendn1ent to the complaint in
intervention.
Nielson lived in the locality of the land. He saw the
crops planted and harvested. He knew of the contract of
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sale between Johnson and Smith and with a reservation
of a lien upon the crops as security for the payment of
the purchase price of the land; if, as now claimed, there
was an appreciable equity in the contract, subject to sale,
it would have been sold.
No evidence was offered or receiYed as to any value
in the contract on the 30th day of October, 1930, upon
which the court could base a finding.
The court finds :
'' . . . that the said property was of a value
of $30.00 per acre and the equity and interest of the
said John W. Smith in said land at said time was of
a value far in exc~ss of $2300.00." (Abs. 123.)
And further:
That the value was in excess of $2300.00 at the time
of the trial. (Finding No. 10, page 123 of the abstract.)
There is no evidence to support such a finding. Evidence was offered by the plaintiff as to the rental value of
the land (Abs. 45) and as to the value of the land (Abs.
102) but nowhere as to the value of a defaulted contract,
subject to forefeiture. There is evidence to the effect
that the trustee sold the interest of John W. Smith in
the property even after payments had been made from
1930 to date of sale, March 9, 1937, for the sum of $500.00
which was the fair value of the property. (Abs. 44.)
And there is evidence that on December 7, 1936, after
payments had been made from October, 1930, to that
date, that the contract was still subject to forfeiture and
forfeiture was declared and notice thereof given, which,
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but for the timely advancement of $1900.00 by the wife
of John W. Smith would have been final. (Abs. 60.) Evidence of the value of the land was of course not evidence
of the value of the contract because payments on th~
contract were to be made before the contract had any
value whatsoever. There is also the agreement of John
W. Smith, the Smith Land Company and J. Cameron
Smith to make a new contract for the purchase of the
property for the sum of $4,000.00, when Charles D.
Moore acquired title thereto. (Abs. 59.)
We assume that this court knows and will take judicial
notice of the fact that in 1929 the nation-wide depression
came; that it grew steadily more severe; that loans upon
farm property ceased to the extent that it became necessary for the United States Government to provide money
with which to assist the farmer; that the market for
wheat all but vanished and when a market was found the
prevailing price for the years intervening between 1930
and 1933 was about 30c per bushel and that installment
payments upon wheat land could not be made from crops
produced. This is reflected in the fact that, although
through the aid of J. Cameron Smith, $6,000.00 had been
paid on the contract, there was still $4,000.00 unpaid on
November 29, 1932, and $2433.88 unpaid when the notice
of forfeiture was given on December 7, 1936. It cannot
be claimed by respondent that the contract was not in
default because on the 7th day of December, 1936, he
listed seven particulars wherein it was in default and
then subject to forfeiture. Now, under the circumstances
20
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what was the contract worth on October 30, 1930 Y There
is no evidence.
Respondent says that the Bankruptcy Court found it
to be worth $500.00 and authorized its sale for that
amount, and upon that sale, Aubrey F. Turley, the purchaser, was substituted as a party intervenor and asked
to be decreed the owner of the property. In the absence
of other evidence, the court could find only $500.00 value
in the property, c~rtainly not a value in excess of
$2300.00. Until it is shown by proper pleading and evidence that there was property on October 30, 1930, subject to judgment lien, execution and sale, then there coul~
be no finding of a conveyance in fraud of creditors.

THE PLAINTIFF, W. A. NIELSON, IN THE BOX
ELDER COUNTY CASE AND DEFENDANT
IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CASE IS
ESTOPPED BY PRnnTY OF CONTRACT
AND BY HIS OWN ACTS FROM QUESTIONING THE LEGALITY OF THE INCORPORATION OF SMITH LAND CO:MPANY OF THE
OWNERSHIP OF THE CONTRACT.
Bigelow on Fraudulent Conveyance, page 481, referring to Coke, the author says:
''Referring to the statute of 13th Elizabeth, Coke
says that if there is fraud at the outset of a transaction, that is actual fraud, nothing afterwards can
anyways salve and amend the matter. That is to say
in the language of later times, the fraud of the stat21
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ute of Elizabeth cannot be purged. Whether and how
far that is true in cases arising under the penal provisions of the statute we do not here inquire; the
question here is of the civil administration of the
law.
The rule of Coke however is not to be taken too
broadly. It requires no citation or authority to show
that a creditor who assents e. g. to an assignment by
his debtor, containing a provision sufficient to avoid
it as fraudulent, such as a trust for the debtor, is
barred by his consent from raising objection afterwards to the assignment for any cause known to him
when he assented. Indeed it is apprehended that
Coke's rule was not intended to apply to cases of
present or subsequent consent or ratification by the
creditor; that the statute is not to be understood as
making the transaction void in such a sense as to prevent subsequent recognition of it as binding; and
that the creditor's consent will always take away the
taint.''
In 2 Pomroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Section 916,
page 1914, the author says:
'' . . . while the party entitled to relief may
either void the transaction or confirm it, he cannot do
both. If he adopts a part he adopts all. He must
reject it entirely if he desires to obtain relief."
And again, Section 964, page 2089, the author says:
"Where a party originally had a right of cancellation or of action to defeat or set aside a transaction on the ground of actual or constructive fraud,
he may lose such remedial right by a subsequent confirmation by acquiescence, and even by mere delay or
laches.''
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In Bigelow on Estoppel (sLxth edition), pag-e 744,
Section 2, the rule is concisely stated:
''So also one who accepts the terms of a deed or
other contract must accept the same as a whole; one
cannot accept part and reject the rest. Thus, a
party actively affirming a transaction such as a contract or a purchase by receiving and retaining money
upon it, is estopped thereafter to deny the force of
any of its express or implied terms or conditions,''
and see following cases with these facts in mind.

The rule applicable to the facts disclosed in this record is clearly stated in 1 Fletcher on Corporations, Section 356, page 755, as follows :
''The estoppel of a person dealing with a pretended corporation to deny its legal incorporation
also operates against persons who stand in his shoes,
or in other words, who are in privity with him. Thus,
it clearly operates as against his executor or administrator, or his heirs, and against one to whom
he assigns his contract with the pretended corporation.''
In McLaughlin v. Park City Bank, 22 Utah 484, 63
Pac. 589, the court said:

"While a creditor is under no obligation to accept the provisions of an assignment made for his
benefit, yet he cannot hold an assignment good in
part and bad in part. If he ratifies it at all he must
stand by it. He cannot accept that part which is
beneficial to him, and repudiate the balance of it.
Nor can he receive the benefits of the assignment
while he is in actual hostility to it, claiming in the
23
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courts that it is fraudulent and void and refusing to
accept its benefits. He cannot claim benefits under
it and at the same time attack it for fraud, and utterly destroy its validity as to him. Burrill on Assignments, Sees. 476-77-79; Jeffries Appeal, 33 Pa. St.
39; Valentine v. Decker, 43 Mo. 583; Beifield v.
Martin, 37 Pac. 32; Alder v. People's Bank, 46 S. W.
536; O'Brien v. Glenn, 17 S. W.1030.
If a creditor accepts the benefits of an assignment knowing the facts he cannot, ordinarily, impeach or repudiate it thereafter, on the ground that
it is illegal and fraudulent. So, having repudiated it
altogether, he cannot take under its provision as
other creditors would do who have accepted it. The
reason of this rule is that he is not entitled to two
inconsistent, adverse or conflicting rights. One is
necessarily a denial of the other. Burrill on Assignments, (6th ed.) 441; Alder v. Bank, 46 S. W.
536.''
And in Kerslake v. Brower, et al., Oregon, 66 P. 437,
it is said:
"A creditor of the assignor, whether provided
for by the assignment or not, who wishes to repudiate the trusts of the assignment on the ground that
they are illegal and a fraud upon the honest creditors
of the assignor must apply to set aside the assignment as fraudulent and void against him as a creditor, instead of coming in under the assignment itself
as a preferred creditor or otherwise.''
Pratt v. Adams, 7 Paige, 615, 641. And Mr. Chief
Justice Gibson says: ''The books are full of cases
which show that a party shall not contest the validity of an instrument from which he draws a benefit,
nor affirm it in part and disaffirm it in part." Irwin
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v. Tabb, 17 Serg. & R. 419. See also Frierson v.
Branch, 30 Ark. 453; Adler-Goldinan Commission
Co. v. People's Bank, 65 Ark. 380, 46 S. W. 536;
O'Bryan v. Glenn, 91 Tenn. 106, 17 S. \V. 1030, 30
...hl. St. Rep. 862; McLaughlin v. Bank (Utah), 63
Pac. 589. The reason of this rule is that a creditor is
not entitled to two inconsistent and adverse rights.
He is required to elect which one he will adopt, and
the election of one is necessarily the rejection of the
other."
Let us take a glance at some of the evidence. As early
as November 28,1930, about one month after the corporati{)n was organized and the contract was assigned, C. D.
Moore, as attorney for M. M. Johnson, wrote demanding
payment of the $2,000.00 installment then due and closed:
"In view of the assignment by you to the Smith
Land Company, I am sending a similar letter to it.
I am also mailing a copy of both addressed jointly
to y{)u and the company at Blue Creek,''

and so continued the letters 27 in all and a receipt being
a part of them received in evidence as Exhibit 9. (Abs.
88.}
Furthermore, Moore proposed acquiring this land and
the contract personally and to make certain as to the balance due and for the purpose of eliminating continuous
delinquencies he had Smith write a proposal on behalf of
himself, the Smith Land Company and J. Cameron Smith
to fix the balance of the purchase price at $4,000.00 payable in installments of $1,000.00 instead of $2,000.00 and
to increase the interest from seven to eight percent. It is
unthinkable that any person would contend that after all
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these letters had been written, and money continuously
collected upon the contract in response to the letters that
either Johnson or Moore could have defended a suit on the
contract upon the grounds that the Smith Land Company
was not the owner of the contract and that it in fact was
not a legal entity.
But Nielson steps into the shoes of Moore as the Assignee of Johnson and takes all rights which they held
and assumed all obligations. He says in his notice:
''The undersigned as the present owner of said
property and of said contract and all rights acquired thereunder by the seller therein named hereby gives you written notice of such defaults." (Abs.
60.)
As he acquired the rights under the contract he assumed
the obligations. He took it as it was with the Smith Land
Company as the owner and he assumed the obligation
under the contract to convey the land to the Smith Land
Company as owner and not otherwise. He could not blow
hot and cold by demanding money from the Smith Land
Company and denying its existence in the same breath.
He could not demand money from any organization without legal existence and without obligation and then deny
its right to the consideration for the money paid. That is
precisely what he sought to do. The notice is addressed
to John W. Smith and to "Smith Land Company," a corporation. It says:
"You are hereby notified that by reason of your
default in the performance of the covenants and conditions of that certain contract entered into by and
26
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---between M. M. Johnson as receiver of Nielson-Burton Company and John W. Smith on the 23rd day of
November, 1936, covering the following described
property, located in Box Elder County, Utah," then
follows a description of the land, etc. (Abs. 60.)
How comes it that the Smith Land Company was in default in the performance of the covenants and conditions
if it had no legal existence and if it were not obligated on
the contract! That notice was given with full knowledge
of all the transactions affecting the contract since its execution and admittedly by the pleadings Nielson knew all
of these facts from and after 1935. And continuing after
specifying seven different particulars wherein the Smith
Land Company was in default, Nielson said:
''Upon your failure (certainly directed to the
Smith Land Company) to comply with the terms and
the covenants and conditions set out in said contract
within thirty days after this written notice of default and demand for performance and to pay the
costs and expenses of enforcing the said agreement,
the undersigned as present owner of said property
and of all rights of the seller in said contract named
will declare a forfeiture of all rights of the purchaser, and any successor to the said purchaser, under the agreement and will take immediate possession of the said property and the whole thereof, and
otherwise enforce all rights of the seller, or his assigns under the said contract,''
and that was dated December, 1936, and signed Wilse A.
Nielson. (Abs. 61.)
It would not be contended that upon payment of the
balance of the purchase price, Wilse A. Nielson was not
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obligated to convey the land in accordance with the terms
of the contract and the notice clearly recognized "any
successor to the said purchaser'' and hence Nielson was
obligated to convey to the assignee of the purchaser. No
question of the assignability of the contract is or could be
raised. Within the thirty day period the money was
tendered by Smith Land Company as successor of John
W. Smith but the tender wa.s refused because the Smith
Land Company had no legal existence and was not the
owner of the contract. The money was then deposited
with the Clerk of the Court and Nielson took the money
at the same time denying the existence of the payor and
of its right to receive the deed. He assumed inconsistent
positions which have never been permitted since the law
of contracts came into existence.
In the light of these authorities can there be any doubt
that when Nielson served notice of intention to forfeit
upon the Smith Land Company, he elected to treat it as
the owner of the contract and as being obligated to pay
him the money which he demanded. He was no doubt
barred from prosecuting the suit to .set aside the assignment of the contract by becoming the transferee of the
land and the contract. He sought, as he states, to in some
form merge the judgments into the contract by acquiring
the title of the ownership o£ the land and the contract
and he took the title with an obligation to convey upon
receipt of the balance of the purchase price under the
same conditions that the land was held by Moore. He
acquired no greater rights than Moore himself held and
he assumed all the obligations and limitations which
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Moore had subjected himself to by his continuous demands upon the Smith Land Company for money and the
response of the Smith Land Company to the demand by
payment to him on account of the purchase price of the
property. The estoppel was in every respect complete.

THE BOX ELDER COUNTY CASE WAS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The assignment of the contract to the Smith Land
Company was made on October 4, 1930. (Abs. 67.) The
snit was filed July 9, 1935. Nielson, the plaintiff, lived
neighbor to John W. Smith and his land was near the
Smith land. He was constantly in touch with Smith and
observed the operations on the land. The complaint alleges that upon the entry of the judgment set out in the
complaint, execution was issued and delivered to the
Sheriff of Box Elder County and said executions were
duly returned by the sheriff wholly unsa tis:fied and ''the
said judgments or any part thereof have not been paid.''
Fortunately the praecipe for the issuance of the execution, the execution and the return are all in the record.
The sheriff was directed to levy upon the real or pers·onal property and advertise the same for sale, ''as soon as
you may do so." The sheriff received the execution on
September 26, 1930, and made his return the 3rd day of
December, 1930. It is true the writ was not filed in the
clerk's office. But the plaintiff alleges the return. He
was fully informed, otherwise he would not have alleged
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the contents or the character of the return. The return
is that:
"I have made demand upon the within n~"illed defendant, John W. Smith for the payment of the
within judgment with interest and costs all as 10re
fully appears in the within writ of execution rhe
defendant stated then and there if I would call J. D.
Skeen, he would take care of the within judgm nt as
he had the money to pay said judgment. I did take
the matter up with J. D. Skeen and on or about the
7th day of November, 1930, I received a letter from
.said J. D. Skeen, a copy of said letter is hereto attached and marked exhibit A and made a part of
this return. I do further certify and return that I
have made due and diligent search and inquirv ~vith
in my jurisdiction and have been unable t\
£1Y
property belonging to the within named dt~~.t.Ldant
but what is mortgaged or exempt from execution
upon which to levy in satisfaction of the within writ.
I therefore return the within writ unsatisfied.''
(Abs. 114.)
The letter from J. D. Skeen to the sheriff attached to
the return as Exhibit A says the property that he, "John
W. Smith," occupied was purchased on contract anc:l 4-1.tle
reserved to both the rent and the crops. "Any r .;.u..uy he
might have had was .sold some time ago.'' Add t~ this information, which, as observed, the plaintiff alleges he had
and what more could have been told to the plaintiff which
would have added to his means of knowledge as of December 3, 1930, and yet he did nothing whatsoever until
July 9, 1935. The bar of the Statute of Limitations, 1042-24 was pleaded. We may say, as this court said in Smith
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. (2d) at page 271:
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"No inquiry of any nature seems to have been
rs.cle."
If an.., inquiry had been made, it is apparent that the
facts would have been disclosed, if any facts other than
thos~ .iv·en had been desired. It is true that the letter did
not stale to whom the property had been sold or what
was r~eived, but even before the sheriff's return Moore,
as attorney for Johnson, had received notice for in the
letter of :Xovember 28, 1930, he said so. (Exhibit 9.)

Nielson conferred with Moore, sought to attach the
crops but was unable to because the contract was in default, and Moore said his client had a mortgage. It is
inco· - · -~ble that in the circumstances Nielson did or
coulu
. ~ closed his eyes to the facts which were apparent on every hand. Under the statute as construed in
the following cases the suit was barred.
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426;
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S.135, 25 L. ed. 807;
Pearsall v. Smith, 149 U. S. 231, 37 L. ed. 713;
Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Mill Com' 56 Utah 449, 191 P. 426;
~..tit Lake City v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 43 Utah 181,
134 P. 603;
Lady Washington Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 45
P. 809.
See numerous cases cited:
37 C. J. 939;
27 c. J. 761;
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Wood on Limitation of Actions, Section 276 b
(11).
The rule is well stated in the case of Jones Mining Co.
v. Cardiff Mining and Mill Company, supra, 56 Utah reports at page 458.
"In all such cases the statute begins to run from
the time the complaining party discovered the
wrongs complained of or when he was apprised of
such facts and circumstances with respect thereto as
would put a person of ordinary intelligence and
prudence upon inquiry. The law is stated to that
effect by this court in the case of Gibson v. Jensen,
48 Utah, 248, 158, Pac. 426, and in Salt Lake City v.
Investment Co., 43 Utah, 181, 134 Pac. 603. If therefore the facts and circumstances which came to the
knowledge of the plaintiff corporation were .such as
would have caused a person of ordinary prudence
and intelligence to act, then it should have acted,
and the statute of limitations was set in motion as
to it."
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Investment Company, supra, this court quoted with approval
the following language of the Supreme Court of California:
"The rule is well established that the means of
knowledge is equivalent to knowledge, and that a
party who has the opportunity of knowing the facts
constituting the fraud of which he complains cannot
be supine and inactive, and afterwards allege a want
of knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches
or negligence." (Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. p. 405;
38 P. page 42.)
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There is not a word of evidence that Smith concealed the
facts. The articles of incorporation were filed in the
county clerk's office and the Secretary of State's office.
They described the land involved in suit and were public
reeords.
It is apparent that W. A. Nielson had the means of
knowing about the assignment and the cause of action,
of any, was barred nearly two years before suit was
commenced.

THE JUDGMENT AS TO ALBERT S.
WHEELWRIGHT IS VOID
Albert S. \\heelwright, as trustee in bankruptcy in
the matter of John W. Smith, filed a complaint in intervention in the Box Elder County case on April 20, 1936,
with the attorney who appeared for the plaintiff. He
filed an amended complaint in intervention, January 12,
1938, with the same attorney. On the trial of the case,
the plaintiff introduced in evidence, a petition for an
order confirming a sale in bankruptcy of the interest of
the bankrupt in the property covered by the contract between John W. Smith and M. M. Johnson; also, the
order confirming the sale and a deed. (Abs. 43, DeedExhibit B.) Signed and acknowledged April 14, 1937,
and on February 4, 1939, the court made an order reciting the sale of the interests of the trustee to Aubrey F.
Turley, and continuing:
"It is now therefore ordered, that A. F. Turley
be and he is hereby substituted herein for Albert S.
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Wheelwright, trustee in bankruptcy of John W.
Smith, bankrupt, and as such substitute is hereby
made a party to this action with all rights and liabilities accruing to him as such substituted party.
Dated this 4th day of February, 1939." (Abs. 116.)
Finding No. 18, Abstract 127 is:
"That the said Albert S. Wheelwright, in the
course of the due administration of the said bankruptcy estate of John W. Smith, caused the said
real estate and all interest of the said John W.
Smith therein to be duly offered for sale under
orders of the court having jurisdiction in said bankruptcy matter and said Albert S. Wheelwright, as
such trustee, sold and transferred by trustee's deed
to Aubrey F. Turley all of the right, title and interest of John W. Smith in and to the said property
and the whole thereof, and pursuant thereto and by
order of said court, the said Albert S. Wheelwright,
as such trustee, reported the .said sale to the Court
and the said sale was by the said Court duly confirmed and the consideration for the said transfer
was paid by the said Aubrey F. Turley to the said
Albert S. Wheelwright and the said Albert S. Wheelwright delivered to said Aubrey F. Turley a deed
transferring all right, title and interest of the said
John W. Smith in said property to Aubrey F. Turley and at the time of the trial of this action the said
Aubrey F. Turley was the owner of all of the right,
title and interest of the said John W. Smith so attempted to be transferred in fraud of his creditors
in and to the said property and the whole thereof
subject only to the homestead exemption rights of
the said John W. Smith."
The proceeding leading up to the .sale by Albert S.
Wheelwright to Aubrey F. Turley of all of the right, title
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and interest of John "\V. Smith in and to the property,
confirmation of the sale and the ronYeyance of the property and the allowanee in the eourt of bankruptey of costs
and expenses of administration that had accrued, the
finding that there was no money with which to pay the
same and that the total amount of the judgments pleaded
with interests amounted to $~4~9.36 were all recited in
finding 18, 19, and ~0. (Abs. 1~7.) And the court concluded:
"That the inteiTenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, is
entitled to a judgment adjudging, determining and
fixing a lien upon the said property in these conclusions described'' (.Abs. 130)
the same being the property described in the contract for
the total amount of the judgment and costs and for the
full amount of the expense of administration of the said
bankruptcy proceeding in said bankruptcy court and as
fixed and determined therein in the amount of $2529.36.
And further, that upon the payment by the Smith
Land Company (Abs. 131) of the sum of $2433.88 as the
balance of the purchase price due on said property, the
intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, trustee in bankruptcy of John W. Smith, bankrupt, is entitled to a judgment and decree and an order of sale of said property to
satisfy the said liens in full, together with costs and expenses of such sale.
The court decreed, that the assignment by John W.
Smith to the Smith Land Company was void:
''As to all of said property and rights and interest therein of the said John W. Smith, over and
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above a homestead exemption therein to the extent
of $2300.00. ''
"That upon the payment by the Smith Land
Company to Wilse A. Nielson of the sum of $2433.88,
the intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, trustee in
bankruptcy of John W. Smith, bankrupt, have and
he hereby is given, granted and decreed a first and
prior lien in, to and upon the following described
real estate and property in Box Elder County, State
of Utah, to-wit:" and then follows the description
of the real estate, "in the amount of $2529.36 and a
further lien in the amount of $1247.00 being the
amount of costs and expenses of administration in
the bankruptcy proceedings of John W. Smith, a
bankrupt, as fixed and determined by the bankruptcy court in which said proceeding is pending."
(Abs. 133.)
At this time, it is necessary to refer to the original
decree and the judgment roll in the Box Elder County
case. It will be observed that the judgment was dated
April 3, 1939, and filed April 4, 1939. Notice of the judgment was given on April 12, 1939. It will be observed
further that the figures $1247.19 are written in ink. We
call attention to an instrument purporting to be signed
by J. T. McConnell, referee in bankruptcy, dated April
11, 1939, and by which he purports to fix the co.sts and expenses including some $750.00 attorneys' fee.s at $1247.19.
That instrument was filed in court May 1, 1939. A certified copy of the proceedings in the federal district court
will show that the order purporting to fix the fees was
appealed from and the matter of fixing the fees and the
costs and expenses has been suspended. Evidently some
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clerk wrote in the figures in the judooment, ten days after
it was signed by the judge and filed.
The mere statement of the facts respecting the items
of $2529.36 and the $1247.19 condemn the judgment as
void. Upon what theory can the court find that Wheelwright has sold his entire interest in the property giving
a deed covering the full interest and then impress a judgment lien upon the property for the sum of $2429.36 in
his favor! .And this too, after finding that the interest of
John W. Smith in the contract to the extent of $2300.00
was exempt. Not only is such a judgment not supported
by the evidence or the findings but upon its face, it is erroneous, if not utterly v-oid.
Furthermore, the court apparently in utter disregard
of his own records provided for the entry of judgment
by the Clerk for the amount of a judgment of some other
court of an entirely different jurisdiction which was to
be thereafter entered-a thing that is unthinkable. This
was not a suit upon a judgment or another court. It
c.onld not have been because no such judgment was
entered. It is an attempt to execute a judgment to be
entered by a federal court through and by means of an
execution of the state court. There is no support under
the law for any such proceeding. If a judgment under the
state practice could be predicated upon a judgment of
the federal court, not then entered, in the same state, certainly it could be done only upon proper pleadings and
proof, none of which are in the records in this case.
An effort was made at the time of the filing of the
transcript in this case to procure an order of the court
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authorizing the filing of a certified copy of an order of
the United States District Court in the matter of John
W. Smith showing that an appeal had been taken from
an order of the referee purporting to allow attorneys'
fees and expenses and that the matter was held under
advisement by the Federal Court, but for conditions over
which appellant had no control the motion could not then
be heard. The motion is now made.
The court will bear in mind that the order of the referee in bankruptcy was filed in the District Court for Box
Elder County after the entry of the judgment. The clerk
evidently inserted the amount .specified as costs in the
bankruptcy proceeding in the judgment which had theretofore been entered. An appeal was then taken from the
order of the referee and to date no costs or expenses
have been allowed. Until the district court passes upon
the matter, there is no basis for the inclusion of the
amount in the judgment and certainly there is no authority in the state court to enter judgment upon a federal
court order and to issue execution for its collection.
It is competent to show these matters by a certified
copy of the federal court order as it would be competent
to show that a judgment appealed from has been paid or
that anything subsequent to the entry of the judgment
has happened to suspend or nullify the judgment. County
of Dakota v. Henry H. Glidden, 113 U. S. 222; 28 L. ed.
981.
In conclusion, we say that each point specified in this
brief .supported by the assignments of error is fatal to
the judgment entered. That is to say-the suit could not
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in the first instance have been sustained because the
property was exempt. The plaintiff was estopped from
questioning the existence of the Smith Land Company
and of the ownership of the contract. If a cause of action
had existed, it was barred by the Statute of Limitations .
.Albert S. Wheelwright having ceased to be a party to the
suit could not be a judgment creditor. No judgment could
be entered in favor of Aubrey F. Turley except to the
extent of the yalue of the contJ·act of November 30, 1930,
in excess of $2300.00 and there was no finding justifying
any such judgment even as to Turley. The court was
wholly without jurisdiction or power to insert, or to permit to be inserted, any order of the Federal Bankruptcy
Court and any order of that court has been suspended if
not set aside . .And finally, the judgment in and of itself
is erroneous, if not void upon its face.

Respectfully submitted,

J.D. SKEEN, E. J. SKEEN,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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